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trafficking, which allowed the organization to increase its war-fighting capabilities. This
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military buildup, and buy political support throughout the region. The exploration of the
financial side of the FARC adds to our understanding of how insurgencies become
successful. Based on open source information, Threat Finance and financial investigative
techniques are underutilized in foreign policy, law enforcement, and intelligence. The
critical role played by financing in the rise of the FARC suggests that Threat Finance efforts
can be most effective when used to track terrorist and criminal networks. American law
enforcement and intelligence agencies should be given bigger budgets and tasked earlier
to shut down or disrupt financial networks of foreign insurgencies, such as the FARC.
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The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) transformed from a traditional guerrilla group into a full-fledged insurgency because of its ability to
effectively convert the proceeds derived from illegal narcotics trafficking
into operational funds. Those financial capabilities allowed the FARC to
challenge governmental authority in large swathes of the Colombian state.
The FARC moved into the drug trade, initially controlling production territory and subsequently engaging in trafficking, which allowed the organization to increase its war-fighting capabilities. This paper only scratches
the surface of the mechanism by which the FARC utilized its coca revenue
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critical role played by financing in the rise of the FARC suggests that
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Introduction
The root of the Colombian Government's war with the FARC (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia) began with the period of Colombian history known as "La
Violencia." In the 1930s and 1940s, Colombia was led by the leftist Liberal
Party, which pushed land and democratic reforms and therefore caused a
backlash from the right-wing, Conservative Party landholders and elites.
The Liberal Party, facing internal struggles, was defeated in the 1946 elections. In 1948, leading Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer
Gaitain was assassinated, and subsequently Colombian society spiraled
into a civil war that resulted in 200,000 to 300,000 deaths.1 The violence
escalated in the broader context of the Cold War because the leftists
received support from Soviet forces, while those on the right were supported by the United States. The FARC rose out of these armed Marxist
peasant militias, which were strongly influenced by Communist ideology
and activists.
Key FARC leaders emerged out of this ideological struggle, including
Commander Pedro Antonio Marin, also known as Manuel Marulanda
Velez, or "Tirofijo," and ideological leader and avowed Marxist Jacobo
Arenas. In 1953, military strongman General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla consolidated power and decreed amnesty for Liberal guerrillas. In 1955, after
consolidating political power, Pinilla reversed his amnesty policy and
went after the holdout guerrillas and pushed them into the Andean foothills. The leaders retreated to this isolated rural foothold that would eventually become the birthplace of the FARC movement.
In 1958, the Liberals and Conservatives reached a political agreement
known as the National Front, which was a power-sharing agreement
between the two major political players. Despite the political agreement
and the declaration of a ceasefire, peasant leaders, such as Arenas and
Tirofijo, became the targets of an assassination campaign. In 1964, with
U.S. encouragement and assistance, the Colombian military engaged in
an operation to destroy the independent "Communist" republics in the
Colombian countryside. In 1965, the armed peasant leaders held a conference in the department of Tolima and agreed to adopt a mobile guerrilla
war strategy. This conference laid the political, ideological, and military
roots of the FARC, which was officially founded in 1966 in Southern
Tolima.
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The FARC Confronts Coca
The FARC remained a small-scale jungle-based guerrilla movement
throughout the 1970s. Alfredo Rangel Suarez, a Colombian military analyst, argues that small-scale guerrilla movements are primarily predatory
and rely on financing methods such as episodic extortion, bank robbing,
and random kidnappings.2 At this point, the movement did not pose a significant security threat to state authority. In the late 1970s, the FARC
began to engage with the local peasants, primarily by supporting the peasants' farming activities. The FARC survived in the 1970s thanks to support
from poor campesinos (rural peasants) and external ideological partners,
such as Russian and Cuban communist groups.
A number of factors coalesced in the late 1970s and provided the opportunity for coca to become a major Colombian export, and the FARC capitalized on this growth to advance their political and military agenda. Prior to
this period, most coca leaf was cultivated in Peru and Bolivia for traditional indigenous uses. In the late 1970s the United States Government
cracked down on the major marijuana trafficking routes used by Mexican
and Jamaican drug traffickers. This crackdown created an economic
opening for Colombian trafficking groups. However, Colombian President
Ayala also started to crack down on marijuana cultivation. This crackdown convinced some marijuana traffickers to switch to cocaine trafficking, which was harder for law enforcement officials to detect and also
more profitable.3
Coca had additional benefits from an agricultural perspective, such as its
hardiness, its ability to thrive in poor soil, and the ease with which it was
processed into nonperishable paste. For poor Colombian peasants with
no land titles and little access to complex irrigation and advanced fertilizers, coca was the most economically lucrative crop. Additionally, growing
U.S. demand for cocaine supported high coca prices and a steady demand.
FARC leaders from the provinces of Putumayo, Caquetá, and Guaviare
realized the early economic benefits from the coca crop and decided to
support and tax coca farming as a method of raising funds, despite the
groups' ideological differences with drugs and drug trafficking.

Seventh Guerrilla Conference and the Adoption of Coca
The Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982 occurred at a critical juncture
in the history of the FARC. The decision by FARC leaders at the Seventh
Guerrilla Conference to support coca cultivation was a monumental decision that would have long-lasting implications for Colombian history. Initially, the FARC was opposed to coca because of its subversive nature and
21
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its exploitation by free-market traffickers. However, the revenue that was
coming from those initial districts convinced the leadership to protect
coca farmers and charge them a gramaje (farm tax). The FARC's decentralized nature allowed for innovation and risk-taking. The push to adopt
coca was led by the FARC leaders in the Colombian province of Caquetá.
The Caquetá front of the FARC was an early adopter of coca farming support in direct opposition to FARC rules.
The political, economic, and military realities facing the FARC at the time
of the Seventh Guerrilla Conference dictated the decisions made by the
FARC leaders. As the FARC leaders convened for the Conference, the
FARC had eighteen active fronts and had just recently added a general
staff and a secretariat responsible for centralized planning. Structurally,
the FARC was beginning to break out of the "defensive" stage of its guerrilla warfare. Economically, the FARC would not have been able to capitalize on these conditions without a means of financing their expansion.
The entrance into the drug trade has been widely cited in the literature for
its role in the FARC's expansion both geographically and in terms of their
capabilities.4 Coca was a motivator for taking new territory as well as a
provider of funding to empower the FARC's military units. The Seventh
Guerrilla Conference marked the time when the group's mentality on coca
changed, due to the financial needs of its proposed expansion. Structurally, the FARC set up the Financial Commission, which established budgets for each of the FARC fronts. The Commission served as the central
clearinghouse for the FARC's revenues.
The group's decision to accept and protect coca farmers allowed the FARC
to expand throughout the Colombian countryside. As the FARC moved
into new communities, it had to win over the local population. Coca cultivation was migrating from Bolivia and Peru into the jungles of Colombia,
led by narco-trafficking groups. These groups were protected by paramilitary organizations which brutally enforced the will of their masters. The
FARC was expanding into the same regions and thus entered into a tenuous relationship with the narco-trafficking groups.

The FARC vs. the Narco-Trafficking Groups: Key
Distinctions
In order to understand the Colombian conflict, it is important not to blur
the key ideological distinction between the FARC and traditional narcotrafficking groups. Many casual observers lump the FARC into the larger
group of narco-traffickers because of their involvement in the drug trade.
However, the FARC was founded as a peasant group whose motivation
22
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was to overthrow the state and implement a "people's government." On
the other hand, narco-trafficking groups were free-market capitalists who
operated primarily for individual financial enrichment. Politically, narcotrafficking groups, most prominently the Medellin Cartel, preferred to
seek out friendly and corruptible government officials. The narcotrafficking groups aspired to having little governmental oversight,
enforcement, or pressure. Practically, that translated into paying corrupt
politicians, enforcement officials, and other civil servants to turn a blind
eye towards drug-trafficking activities.
The similarity between the FARC and the narco-trafficking groups ended
with their dependence on coca, coca paste, and cocaine for the majority of
their revenue. When the FARC first entered the drug trade, they protected
coca growers and taxed the sale of coca to the narco-traffickers. The
narco-traffickers would take raw coca leaf or coca paste and process it into
cocaine. Then they would export the Colombian cocaine to their buyers in
international locations, such as the United States and Europe. Both
groups relied heavily on the revenues derived from illegal drug use in the
developed world.
Unlike the FARC, the narco-trafficking groups wanted to maximize profit
by reducing associated costs; thus they harassed, intimidated, stole from,
and generally mistreated peasants in order to get the lowest price for the
coca leaf. The poor Colombian peasants were not viewed as a long-term
asset by the narco-traffickers but simply as a short-term partner to be
abused. Given the narco-trafficking groups' more widespread geographic
presence, they were more flexible in where they acquired coca leaves and
paste. The lack of a defined territory reduced the incentive for establishing deep local ties.
The FARC's left-leaning political ideology dictated institutional wealth
and equality over profit maximization. From the FARC's perspective, the
peasants were their greatest strategic asset, and profit maximization was
viewed as an evil of the opposition. When the FARC moved into a new
community, they first raised coca prices above the level set by narcotraffickers and provided protection from narco-trafficking thugs. Once
the FARC had infiltrated a new territory, they adopted state-like functions
and provided public services to previously ungoverned populations.
Although the FARC guerrillas moved into a new area with military force,
they also took responsibility for collecting taxes, settling disputes,
providing health and educational services, and improving infrastructure,
such as roads and landing strips. The provision of services and outreach
to the local community fit with the institutional wealth motto of the
FARC. The FARC provided pseudo-state functions, including the "Reglas
23
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de Convivencia," which regulate such issues as carrying arms, fishing,
hunting, working hours, liquor consumption, prostitution, interfamily
violence, drug abuse, and cutting trees.5 One telling example of a FARC
community project was the beer tax:
"The revenues are used to support local schools and other
projects. Usually an elected committee from the locality decides
on disbursement and allocation of the taxes collected. In Remolinos del Caguan, a locality where this beer tax is levied, an elected
committee of students and teachers was set up to collect the tax
and disburse it for construction of a local school. FARC members
enforce the system if the payment is irregular."6
It seems counterintuitive to focus on community level programs such as
the beer tax allocation in Remolinos del Caguan, but this program is critical in understanding how the FARC grew from a band of rebels with less
than 100 members to the largest guerrilla movement in South American
history. The FARC used the drug trade to become institutionally wealthy;
this institutional wealth was used to further its political objectives. The
FARC was able to leverage the support of the local population into territorial control, which led to economic growth, and then military strength.

The Fight over Coca-Farming Land
The two groups started as financial allies, but in the 1980s they competed
for control of valuable coca farming land. The tension between the traffickers and the FARC increased as the narco-trafficking groups reinvested
their profits by buying agricultural land in Colombia. These purchases
displaced campesinos and fueled the FARC's call for agrarian reform. The
FARC pushed for agrarian reform in order to take land from large landholders, especially prominent drug traffickers, and redistribute it to local
farmers. From the FARC perspective, small peasant farmers supplied coca
taxes to FARC militants, while large landholders paid paramilitaries to
harass FARC-friendly populations and attack FARC positions. Agrarian
reform thus provided political capital and achieved military goals.
As the two groups competed over land, the conflict became violent.
Despite the FARC's peasant protection strategy, the FARC did mistreat
some resistant peasant groups. In fact, there is evidence that the FARC
would forcibly recruit or kidnap young boys into the FARC's military
ranks.7 The traffickers responded to FARC advances and kidnapping raids
by creating self-defense groups or paramilitary organizations, most prominently the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia).
24
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As the FARC witnessed the revenue potential of coca trafficking, it moved
up the production chain. Initially, FARC operated as a taxer of goods coming into and out of the region, but they were not traffickers. They charged
the traffickers to import pre-cursor chemicals, such as acetone and sulfuric acid, and taxed the finished product that left the area. Next they taxed
groups on the maintenance of facilities, aircraft, and for the use of FARC
landing strips. Over time, they moved into the trafficking business by taking over coca purchasing, providing pseudo-state functions, eliminating
trafficking groups, and building refineries.
After the acceptance of coca farming increased their operational strength,
the FARC expanded into new regions of the Colombian countryside. The
FARC targeted rural countryside that supported coca cultivation in the
departments of Guaviare, Caquetá, and Putumayo. By 1990, the FARC
had opened up nine fronts in the Department of Meta, now a major cocaproducing region. The tenuous relationship between the FARC, the paramilitaries, and the Colombian state erupted into open conflict as the
FARC expanded its presence and control over the population. As money
flowed into the coffers of the FARC and the narcos, both groups were able
to attract, pay, and equip larger numbers of soldiers, albeit oftentimes
using harsh tactics. Additionally, Colombia experienced a reverse migration from urban areas into rural areas of coca production—known as the
coca rush—because of economic weakness in Colombian cities and the
potential for a get-rich quick lifestyle in narcotics. This reverse migration
provided a large population of disaffected people who were easily
recruited by both the FARC and the paramilitary groups.
From a broader economic angle, the coca industry thrived in Colombia in
the 1990s, due to the exposure of Colombian food products to international markets, an increased income inequality in Colombian cities, a
crackdown on Peruvian and Bolivian coca crops, and a surge in U.S.
demand for South American cocaine. The Colombian agricultural sector
accounted for 40% of the national economy in 1945, but by 1984 it
accounted for only 22.5%.8 As Colombia opened its markets to the global
economy, many staple crops were no longer profitable, and many farmers
turned to coca to supplement their income. As Colombian cities grew and
the urban poor became increasingly disenfranchised, the coca industry
offered an escape from the dregs of urban life. In fact, many of the major
coca-producing regions were marked by a population influx.9
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Methods of Financing during the Growth of the
FARC
During the 1970s, when the FARC remained a small-scale guerrilla movement, FARC budgets and financing were easily taken care of with hard
currency. The FARC were confined to a limited territory and had weak ties
to the people, and thus their economic activities were essentially predatory.10 As military analyst Alfredo Rangel Suarez states:
"At this stage, the insurgent groups are vulnerable to the state's
coercive apparatus, and consequently they concentrate on
searching for resources that require minimal exposure and yield
benefits only once. The crimes most common in this predatory
mode are episodic extortion, bank robberies, and random
kidnappings."11
Reports from military and intelligence officers indicated that the FARC
was stashing large sums of currency in jungle hideaways.12 With hard currency from these activities, the FARC did not need to launder funds in
order to remain operational.
Once coca revenue flooded the FARC's Financial Commission, FARC
leaders were able to make strategic investments to drastically improve its
organizational strength. For example, FARC forces were sent to the
former Soviet Union and Vietnam; a military academy was set up to prepare the guerrillas for a command structure; and investments were made
in the FARC's command, control, and communications systems.13 Once
the FARC became entrenched in an area, it was able to generate revenue
from activities other than coca production, such as extortion, kidnapping,
the expansion of commerce, and taxing non-coca related goods. Coca
acted as a gateway to a much wider range of economic activities. The
FARC used its growing military and state-making powers to break out of
its traditional areas of control. By "colonizing" new areas of the Colombian state, the FARC became a powerful force in Colombia.
The U.S. and Colombian crackdown on the Medellin and Cali cartels
created a political and economic vacuum that was partially filled by an
expanding FARC.14 U.S. and Colombian law enforcement officials
engaged in the high-profile targeting and capture of major cartels leaders,
the most famous being Pablo Escobar. Less publicized but arguably more
important was the 1989 takedown of José Rodriguez-Gacha, Escobar's
right-hand man and key financier. The Colombian Government, along
with international partners, froze over $80 million in Gacha's assets. The
26
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case was undoubtedly a success for law enforcement and a major blow for
the Medellin Cartel. In 1993, the news of Escobar's death made
international news and generated significant praise for American and
Colombian counternarcotics efforts. However, the elimination of Escobar
had unforeseen consequences on the Colombian drug trafficking
environment, such as the fragmentation of trafficking groups. These new
groups evolved into smaller, decentralized, tightly-knit networks. As the
trafficking groups proliferated but simultaneously shrank in size, the
high-profile targeting tactics became ineffective. The new generation of
narco-traffickers learned to avoid vertical integration and high-profile
behaviors. As new leaders vied for control of the trafficking trade, the
FARC seized upon the opportunity to strengthen its control of the
production phase.
The FARC gradually moved up the production chain by creating alliances
with international trafficking groups and adopting some characteristics of
the narco-trafficking groups. Once the FARC had integrated with the local
community, they set prices, controlled marketplaces, extorted from foreign companies, and provided public services. As the revenue from a
municipality grew, the FARC made infrastructure improvements, such as
landing strips, processing facilities, better roads, schools, and health clinics. Electoral support for FARC candidates allowed the FARC to gain
hegemony over large areas of previously ungoverned or weakly governed
Colombian territory. Once the FARC monopolized state functions in an
area, they dictated policies and encroached on businesses formerly run by
external groups, especially narco-traffickers. For example, in 1991, a
FARC commander boasted about funding his war chest from cocaine laboratories.15 The FARC taxed narco-trafficking groups on the maintenance
of facilities, aircraft, and for the use of FARC landing strips. With these
assets, the FARC made connections with international trafficking groups,
such as the Arellano-Felix cartel based in Tijuana, Mexico.16
The strategic improvements coincided with a period of weak governance
by the Colombian state. Even before the surge in drug trafficking in
Colombia, the government was stricken by tax and tariff avoidance
through asset and income laundering. According to Economist Francisco
Thoumi:
"Money laundering itself is a relatively new policy issue, and it
was not considered a crime in many countries. Following an old
Spanish legal tradition, Colombia had long-standing legislation
against 'illicit enrichment,' but it was not 'typified,' and thus it
was unenforceable. Only in the mid-1990s did Colombia develop
legislation that typified asset laundering as a crime."17
27
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The Colombian Government was simply not aware of or not able to tackle
this issue, in part because the country was desperate for hard currency;
and attacking these systems would have depleted international reserves
during a period of economic fragility.18

The FARC vs. the Narco-Trafficking Groups: Different
Money-Laundering Needs
It is critical to make the distinction between the money-laundering
activities of the FARC and the narco-trafficking groups. For drug
traffickers, the process of money laundering is much more complex
because the groups must change money from U.S. dollars into Colombian
pesos. Colombian cartels, like most influential drug-trafficking
organizations, generate a large amount of cash at the end of the
production line—places such as the United States and Europe—and the
cash must be made available to pay their suppliers. This requires that
traffickers must launder small, hard currency bills, typically by placing
them in Western financial institutions, commingling the funds with funds
generated at cash-intensive businesses, disguising the source of funds,
and then transferring the balance to overseas accounts. From an AntiMoney Laundering (AML) perspective, drug traffickers need to hide the
source of their illicit income and will generally reinvest the money from
the illicit sector into operational budgets and luxury sectors. This
occurred in Colombia, most notably in sectors such as real estate, soccer
teams, import/export business, hotels and casinos, smuggled imports (in
San Andresitos), and construction. Progress has been made as moneylaundering experts have identified these sectors and provided guidance
for banks to assist in identifying illegal activity.19
On the other hand, the FARC was motivated by ideology and a desire to
gain political power. In the beginning, the FARC were simply acting as an
intermediary between drug traffickers and the peasants; thus they were
only interested in payment in pesos. As the FARC moved up the coca production chain, it needed to adopt some of the money-laundering techniques and investment strategies of the drug traffickers. Still, the FARC
did not distribute narcotics in the United States; thus they did not need to
"place" or "hide" the source of their funds. A major distinction remained:
the FARC was primarily interested in Colombian pesos, while the narcotrafficking groups were primarily interested in U.S. dollars and other
internationally liquid currencies.
In the 1980s and 1990s the FARC presented a difficult Threat Finance target because they did not operate internationally,20 but rather used
Colombian pesos that had already been laundered. By operating in
28
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Colombia, the United States was forced to rely on international cooperation and joint agreements to attack FARC financiers. The lack of political
will in Colombia, combined with the misguided U.S. drug policies in the
1980s and early 1990s, allowed the FARC to expand their presence. Once
the Colombians enlisted American help in the form of Plan Colombia, the
law enforcement, intelligence, military, and civilian agencies in both
countries began to coordinate and utilize each other's strengths to break
the FARC. From a Threat Finance perspective, the first step was to criminalize money laundering and push for similar reforms that allowed intelligence and law enforcement agencies the legal ground to pursue
investigations.
Just as the FARC moved into the drug production and trafficking business, the FARC utilized some of the money-laundering techniques of the
narco-traffickers. In 1975, the Colombian Government opened the "ventanilla siniestra" (left-hand window) as a means of generating foreign
exchange. During this period little attention was paid to the concept of
money or asset laundering, and the Colombian Government followed conservative economic policy prescriptions, which stipulated that the accumulation of foreign exchange improves economic health. Unfortunately,
the ventanilla siniestra sacrificed transparency, rule of law, and tax revenue in its attempt to attract U.S. dollars. The ventanilla siniestra operated by allowing Colombian financial institutions to accept U.S. dollars
from any source without questions. Narco-traffickers were effectively selling U.S. dollars in Colombia for a profit, and then the Central Bank was
placing the "drug money" into the U.S. financial system. The FARC were
then paid in cleaned Colombian pesos. The ventanilla siniestra was
closed in 1991 during a period of economic liberalization in Colombia.21
The ventanilla siniestra was replaced by the Black Market Peso Exchange
(BMPE), which by the mid-1990s was the largest known moneylaundering operation in the Western Hemisphere.22 The BMPE operates
in six steps:
1. Drug cartels accumulate dollars from street sales of narcotics in the
United States.
2. In Colombia, a cartel representative sells the cash (which stays in the
United States) to a peso broker at a discount. The broker repays the
narcotics representative with clean Colombian pesos. The narcotrafficker is now out of the picture.
3. In the United States, the peso brokers use various methods to "place"
the cash into U.S. financial institutions.
29
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4. Back in Colombia, the peso broker locates businessmen who want to
import U.S. trade goods: electronics, apparel, foodstuffs, cigarettes,
gold, etc.
5. The broker makes a payment from a U.S. account where the narcofunds were deposited, to pay for the trade goods.
6. The BMPE represents a tremendous vulnerability because unlike financial institutions, manufacturers and distributors of trade goods and
commodities have no systems in place to detect dirty money.23
During the 1990s, the U.S. Treasury estimated that the BMPE laundered
$5 billion dollars worth of drug money per year. It is critical to again
reinforce the distinction between the trafficking groups and the FARC.
The narco-trafficking groups operated on an international level, while the
FARC primarily took advantage of the lax Colombian financial system.
Although even if the FARC is not directly responsible for placing dirty
money into U.S. financial institutions, the FARC still supplies drug
distribution networks with their product. These distributors, now mostly
Mexican-based trafficking groups, are responsible for laundering drug
funds into the U.S. financial system in order to pay their Colombian
suppliers.24
In the past ten years, the BMPE has become more complex because
placement is occurring in Mexican casas de cambios in addition to
placement in the United States. Mexican drug-trafficking organizations
are engaged in the bulk smuggling of cash from the United States into
Mexico to avoid U.S. regulations and to ease payment to Colombian
suppliers.25 As outlined above, Step 3 has changed locations, adding
additional challenges to combating illicit finance flows. Mexican peso
exchange houses are also involved in international wire transfers that
fund BMPE purchases. Finally, this added layer has made it easier for
Colombian suppliers to get access to their funds. There are competing
hypotheses that explain the addition of Mexican bulk-cash smuggling.
The first hypothesis states that U.S. legislation, specifically the USA
PATRIOT Act and its provisions on Bank Secrecy, has deterred criminals
from abusing the U.S. financial systems.26 The second hypothesis states
that the rise of Mexican drug-trafficking organizations and the ease of
bulk-cash smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border has made it more
convenient and secure to place the funds into Mexican financial
institutions.27 It is clear that the FARC remains a key actor in the moneylaundering network, despite the fact that they are not directly responsible

30

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss1/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.1.2

Cook: The Financial Arm of the FARC

The Financial Arm of the FARC: A Threat Finance Perspective

for placing funds into the U.S. financial system. However, the peso
brokers in Colombia are the ones who enable the FARC to get paid for
coca and coca-related activities.
The FARC's rapid expansion in the 1990s was fueled by their increasing
involvement in the narcotics trade and their ability to successfully launder
the drug proceeds into operational funds. The FARC was able to support
an increase of 5,000 soldiers from 13,200 in 1989 to its peak of 18,000 in
the late 1990s. In addition, the FARC military successes forced the newlyelected Pastrana government to cede 40% of Colombian territory to the
FARC. President Pastrana withdrew all military and police units from this
"Zona de Distension" in an effort to establish peace with the FARC. The
policy was a failure, and the withdrawal of state forces allowed the FARC
to consolidate its power in the aptly nicknamed "Farclandia."28 In July of
1999, according to a Gallup poll, approximately 65% of Colombians
believed the Guerrillas were capable of military victory in Colombia.29 It
is from the depths of this conflict that the Colombian state was able to rescue its country. Much literature has been devoted to unpacking the reasons for the Colombian Government's success, but this paper suggests
that policymakers should not underestimate the importance of intelligence, law enforcement, and policy reform, particularly in the areas of
Threat Finance and Anti-Money Laundering.

Recommendations
Policymakers seeking to disrupt and defeat trafficking groups and insurgencies should utilize Threat Finance capabilities to identify and eliminate money launderers. Although following the money is currently a
priority among policymakers, it should be deployed earlier and with more
resources. From a targeting perspective, the peso brokers in Colombia
offer a rare link between trafficking groups and Colombian guerrillas. In
addition to the rare access they have, peso brokers are motivated essentially by greed. They are engaging in illegal activity and earning a hefty
profit by enabling drug traffickers, drug producers, tax evaders, contraband smugglers, and various other criminal organizations. This motivation makes them an easy target for recruitment. The centralized Financial
Commission is a key node in the FARC's operational structure. While the
FARC is generally a decentralized organization with multiple independent
fronts, the Financial Commission offers intelligence officers a high-value
target in the fight against the FARC.
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From a law enforcement perspective, more needs to be done to strengthen
international AML policies. Asset forfeitures, economic sanctions, and
public shaming all require lengthy judicial or legislative processes, thus
blunting their power. Besides good intelligence, cash seizures are one of
the few sharp tools in money-laundering cases. However, they require
exhaustive investigations, as well as an element of good fortune. Yet cash
seizures cannot bring down criminal enterprises in isolation. In order to
fight against narcotics-funded insurgencies, the U.S. needs to fuse law
enforcement agencies with intelligence capabilities and push for stronger
AML policies, both in the target country and on the international stage.
Progress has certainly been made in this area by agencies such as the
DEA, Treasury, and U.S. military;30 however, this is an area where the
United States should devote more resources, both domestically and
through liaison relationships.
Permanent network disruption is a viable goal; however, money and
financing is extremely fluid and transferrable. It is unlikely that AML
tools and sanctions can be a long-term or strategic-level tool. In other
words, tools to "follow the money" are not a panacea for international
conflict. Rather, Threat Finance should be focused primarily on information gathering and used in critical tactical situations. There is always a
trade-off between excessive regulations, which stifle growth, and lax oversight, which misses criminal behavior and creates negative externalities.
Ratification of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement would also be an
important step in reducing tariffs, increasing transparency, and increasing trade. This would in turn harm the corrupt import/export businesses
in Colombia by removing the arbitrage opportunities, while promoting
sustainable economic growth. The BMPE originated because Colombia
had a history of smuggling goods to avoid high tariffs. In addition to stifling free trade, controlled prices create a demand for black-market goods.
Promoting growth provides two main benefits to the fight against narcoterrorist groups, as well as the FARC. First, the implementation of the
U.S.-Colombia FTA would reduce the black-market demand for dollars by
removing high tariffs. Without a huge black-market demand for dollars,
many Colombian money exchange houses would go out of business, and
the remaining business would be subject to stricter oversight. Secondly,
economic growth would provide an alternative for poor farmers who currently grow coca. The rural poverty issue in Colombia can be viewed as a
fault of the state, or it can be viewed as a consequence of the culture of
violence and drugs that has attracted migrant workers into the rural countryside. This land is simply not suited to sustain a large human population. As Richani states, "Coca and other illicit plantations generated a
reverse migration process; the unemployed migrated from cities to areas
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of colonization."31 Instead of focusing on agricultural assistance programs, the Colombian state should focus on urban economic growth,
which could sustainably attract and support an influx of the rural poor.

Conclusion
The FARC could not have assembled its fighting force, bought its
weapons, bought public officials at all levels, or controlled vast swathes of
Colombian territory without the ability to launder money. Early FARC
leaders were confined to a small-scale parasitic existence funded by
single-event financing activities such as bank robberies, kidnappings, and
small raids. During the Seventh Guerrilla Conference, the FARC officially
adopted coca farming as a legitimate means to earn a living. The FARC
offered protection and better conditions to poor coca peasants in return
for a small tax on the coca trade. As the coca racket expanded into new
territories, the FARC's financial revenue exploded. The FARC was able to
successfully adopt effective money-laundering techniques which
supported its massive operational, political, and geographic growth. In
the 1990s the FARC reached its zenith when it was granted 40% of
Colombian territory in a failed peace deal. An aggressive counternarcotics
and counterinsurgency strategy, named Plan Colombia, was instituted by
the Colombian Government with help from the United States. The scope
of Plan Colombia is beyond this paper, but some of the financial crimes
prosecuted during this period can attest to its success.
In order to better understand the mechanism of FARC financing, additional research needs to be undertaken. Information could be gained from
interviews with FARC leaders and financiers, from money-launderers in
Colombia, and from law enforcement and intelligence officers who
worked this topic in the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically, it would be interesting to discover when the FARC first embraced the black-market
exchange system. One would expect a strong positive correlation between
the amount of FARC drug money that moved through the BMPE and the
military strength of the FARC, measured both in terms of number of
fighters and percentage of Colombian territory controlled. Colombia has
made great strides in creating, strengthening, and enforcing its financial
transparency legislation and institutions. The flip side of that improvement is that during the FARC's ascent, the Colombian financial world was
rife with corruption, tax-evasion, smuggling, and money-laundering. This
financial black market enabled the growth of the FARC.
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The policy implication from this period in Colombian history is that
without financial oversight, transparency, and enforcement, criminal and
guerrilla groups were able to thrive. Financial monitoring is another tool
in the government's arsenal for countering illicit organizations. Threat
Finance capabilities need to be strengthened and deployed into trouble
areas before violence erupts, not afterwards. Political reform and
transparency are generally judged to be secondary priorities in conflict
areas. However, that view is challenged by the facts in this case because of
the role black markets played in financing the growth of the FARC's
insurgent forces. When confronting similar enemies such as the opiumfinanced Taliban, U.S. policymakers would be wise to push for financial
transparency and empower intelligence agencies early on to collect on
black-market financiers.
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